

Trends for Radicalism and Violent Extremism in Asia (Indonesian Case)

Musdah Mulia

Executive Summary

Indonesia is currently facing a situation of escalating intolerance, radicalism, terrorism and violent extremism. Some regions are showing a worrying trend of intolerance combined with increasing political identity issues. Young people are vulnerable to exposure to radicalism that tends to be anti-pluralistic. As a nation that is open to the outside world, Indonesia is feeling the impact of the global war against terrorism. The root of the problem is global political injustice that gives rise to poverty, social disparity, and oppression steeped in exclusive theology. And so anti-West, anti-America, anti-capitalism, anti-modernity, anti-globalization, and anti-*thagut* slogans are emerging. Terrorism uses religion for justification.

The roots of Islamic radicalism have been present in Indonesia since the early years of independence, and some experts even say that it was evident since long before that. The Islamic State Indonesia movement (NII) was a very strong indication in that direction. The remain followers of this organization have joined Al-Qaeda and ISIS. They take advantage of any sign of the government's weaknesses. If the government is weak, then these Islamic groups become stronger. This situation is further aggravated by the expansion of the HTI as a trans-national organization. In addition, ISIS is using the Internet as a media to spread their ideology and terror at the same time. The ISIS terrorist network, including in Indonesia, has changed strategies by using the media for propaganda, and lone wolves. The current trend of terrorists is no longer dominated by adult males, but also by women and even children.

Therefore, CVE measures must undergo a fundamental change. Aside from taking advantage of sophisticated technology, the approach used must adopt the principles of justice and gender equality as well as rely on the experience of women. Women are effective weapons as counter-terrorism agents through creation of strategies and community-based programs. Women (wives) can also be seen as the important agents to strengthen the spirit of nationality through the values of tolerance.

The government must think of a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy combined with efforts to promote pluralism within a civilized and democratic framework in a systematic way. In addition to all that, the government must also resolve the root causes of terrorism, namely injustice, poverty and social disparity. Then the government must settle the various internal conflicts that have never been resolved as well as the political dissatisfaction that has been an ongoing problem for so long. At the same time, there is a need for concrete counter ideology measures through education in the widest sense of the

word, including counter radicalism and terrorism efforts through moderate and family-based religious education.

Finally, the government must always prioritize a human rights framework. The government and the civil society need to synergize and work together to improve the quality of education in politics of citizenship, democracy, human rights and Pancasila values. In implementing those educational programs, the government needs to involve civil society organizations and women's NGOs, political parties, religious community organizations, professional and entrepreneur groups, cultural, arts and disability groups. It is only then that we can achieve an Indonesia that is democratic, pluralist, advanced and prosperous.

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I. Background

International attention began to focus intensively on terrorism ever since the WTC bombing on September 11, 2001. The world was appalled by the incident that took the lives of 5.700 civilians. This tragedy enraged the US and culminated in the president George W. Bush, making a controversial statement that the mastermind behind the WTC tragedy was Osama Bin Laden with the Al-Qaeda Network based in Afghanistan. The US, in collaboration with its allies, launched air attacks against the military bases and weapons installation of the Taliban army suspected of protecting Osama Bin Laden. The US anti-terrorism movement began with attacks on October 7, 2001, where the world's focus shifted from the US to Afghanistan.¹

As a country that is open to the world, Indonesia has felt the impact of the global war against terrorism. Not long after the WTC tragedy, Indonesia suffered a terrorist attack by the *Jamaah Islamiyah* (JI). A series of terrorist incidents followed in Indonesia, such as the Bali Bombing I, 2002, the Bali Bombing II in 2005, bombing of several embassies, foreign vital objects, the JW Marriot hotel in Jakarta, and other bombing incidents that took place sporadically in several locations within Indonesia

The Bali Bombing was not the first such incident in Indonesia. In 2000, on Christmas Eve to be exact, several bombing incidents took place in a number of churches in Jakarta.² Following those Christmas bombings, several radical acts by way of bombing happened. These incidents were linked to the radical views of Osama Bin Laden. When he saw how Israel was oppressing the Palestinian people in Gaza, he became determined to wage war against all the infidel allies of Israel. In his view, the West and all its allies were treating Muslims unjustly, particularly Muslims in the Palestine. This global injustice then became a crucial issue that kept on being reproduced and seemed convincing to some Muslims in the world. Anti-West then turned into Anti-America, a nation considered as a super-power state that was controlling the world.

Osama Bin Laden was deadly serious. He apportioned all his property towards the jihad against the West and its allies. Aside from his property, he also issued two *fatwas*. The first one was issued in 1996 and it said: "All Muslims across the world must break off any relationship with infidel oppressors, and this includes abandoning any western-oriented life style. Muslims must return to the *sunnah* and leave all forms of *bid'ah* as well as any kind of deviation influenced by the West." The next fatwa was issued in 1998: All Muslims in the world have the obligation to fight for and uphold pure Islamic values and reiterate a

¹ Agus Subagyo. 2015. *Teroris(me): Aktor & Isu Global Abad XXI*, Bandung: Alfabeta, pp. 19-20.

²See <http://www.beritasatu.com/hukum/46781-detik-detik-sebelum-aksi-bom-natal-2000.html> (July 16, 2018). See also "Sejumlah Bom Meledak Serentak di Malam Natal" dalam <https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/5550/sejumlah-bom-meledak-serentak-di-malam-natal> (July 16, 2018).

global caliphate that will unite all Muslims around the world under one power and uphold the laws of Allah.³

Not long after Osama issued those fatwas, Ba'asyir and Sungkar returned to Indonesia.⁴ Two years later, Ba'asyir established the *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* (MMI) in 2000.⁵ This event reiterated the connection between Ba'asyir and Osama's movement, demonstrated among others by the tone of the speech he gave on the opening of the first congress of the MMI. Ba'asyir openly urged for sermons and jihad. Ba'asyir also emphasized on the importance of owning *ruhul jihad* (endless love for jihad and martyrdom) and knowledge about *fiqhul qital*, namely learning about war tactics and strategies and how to use weapons.⁶ Ricklefs even goes so far as to say that the books provided in Ba'asyir's Islamic Boarding School, in Ngruki, included volumes on guerilla warfare and strategies, books written by Osama Bin Laden's mentor, Abdullah Azzam. It is important to note that August of 2000 marked the beginning of a series of suicide bombings in Indonesia.

However, there are some who believe that during the early years of reforms, what began to develop was radicalism based on ethnicity. This can be seen from the various collective violence and social unrest that took place in Sampit, Poso, and Ambon. This type of radicalism then underwent a transformation into terrorist radicalism.⁷

Bombing incidents that happened in Indonesia during the period between 2000 and 2018 were frequently considered as terrorist activities. Terror and terrorism became two popular and seemingly inseparable words for the public, the mass media and government following the WTC incident in 2001. The term terrorism was furthermore used to describe every act using bombs or violence for political purposes.⁸ So far, the definition of terrorism is an ongoing debate although experts have come up with a description of terrorism for legal purposes. Every nation defines terrorism based on their book of law to regulate, prevent and mitigate terrorism.⁹

Many popular figures such as Richard Dawkins and Sam Harris blame religious ideology as the main cause of terrorism. In his book, *The God Delusion*, Dawkins views religion as a virus that manipulates people to sacrifice all the resources they own (including their lives) for the existence of that religion itself. Similarly, Sam Harris views the holy

³Jamhari & Jajang Jahroni. 2004. *Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia*. Jakarta: Raja Grafindo Persada. p. 29. See also Rohmatul Izad, "Fatwa Mendiang Osama Bin Laden" in <https://geotimes.co.id/opini/fatwa-mendiang-osama-Bin-Laden/> (July 19, 2018). See also the fatwa of Osama bin Laden in <https://fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm> (July 19, 2018).

⁴Ba'asyir and Sungkar back to Indonesia from Malaysia in 1998.

⁵Ba'asyir established MMI without Sungkar in 1999. The first congress of MMI held in Yogyakarta, August 5-7, 2000.

⁶Ba'asyir's speech on the congress of MMI in M. C. Ricklefs. 2013. *Mengislamkan Jawa; Sejarah Islamisasi di Jawa dan Penentangannya dari 1930 sampai Sekarang*. Jakarta: Serambi. pp. 654-656.

⁷ Agus Subagyo. 2015. *Teroris(me): Aktor & Isu Global Abad XXI*, Bandung: Penerbit Alfabeta, p. 55.

⁸ Kamus *Oxford*, Inggris: Oxford University Press, 4th Edition, p. 459.

⁹ Indriyanto Seno Adji. 2001. *Terorisme dan HAM dalam Terorisme: Tragedi Umat Manusia*. Jakarta: O.C Kaligis dan Associates. p. 17. See also <https://news.detik.com/berita/4031949/ini-definisi-terorisme-di-dunia-bagaimana-dengan-indonesia>

book as a source of intolerance and violence against those of different religions. However, violent and radical acts involve more complex factors than merely ideological (religious) narratives. The fact is that only a small number of people with *jihadist-salafist* ideology choose to carry out acts of terror in the name of religion.¹⁰

The fact is that since 2002 to now, terrorist acts have had different motives. Between 2000-2009 most terrorist acts have been based on an Anti-West sentiment. Although in 2003 the suicide bombing at the Australian Embassy by Heri Gholun was grounded on a desire for revenge due to the sentence given to the Bali bombers, it is still categorized as an anti-West motive. And then from 2011-2016 and even until the last minute yesterday, the motive for terrorism shifted to anti-*thaghut* or in other words, declaring war on the enemies of Islam. The target of those terrorist acts is the state, in this case, the police force, considered as a representation of the state in obstructing the terrorists' movement. In time, the anti-*thagut* and anti-West motives culminated in one incident of suicide bombing by Afif, Dian and Ali on January 14, 2016 at Thamrin Street, Jakarta.

Aside from groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda and ISIS, we have the transnational organization namely the Hizbut Tahrir or better known as HTI. The goal of this group is to establish a Caliphate of Islamic State that is not segregated by territories within a nation, for which the leader shall absolutely be a Caliphate. The Hizbut Tahrir's key figure is Taqiuddin An-Nabhani, and in fact, the reference for HT's ulemas is the book "Nidzamul Islam" by Nabhani.¹¹ One section of the book contains a radical viewpoint about the types of states. For Hizbut Tahrir, there are only two forms of states, namely an Islamic State and a Kaffir State.¹² This radical view has been the catalyst for HT's followers to wage a jihad to establish an Islamic State. For the purpose of establishing a caliphate, HT doesn't always use peaceful ways, but also employs violence, and even terror. This has happened in some countries like Iraq, Syria, Jordan and Egypt, where the Hizbut Tahrir have tried to infiltrate the government and carry out a coup d'etat against the rightful government.¹³ These views and indications of going against the government has become the basis for the prohibition of the Hizbut Tahrir in some countries, including Indonesia.¹⁴

II. Trends of Domestic Extremism/Intolerance Exploring

The roots of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia have been evident since the early years of independence. Not long after the Renville Agreement, Sekarmadji Maridjan

¹⁰See: <https://theconversation.com/ideologi-dan-agama-hanya-sebagian-alasan-aksi-terorisme-pasca-11-september-91846> (July 5, 2018).

¹¹See <http://www.gunromli.com/2018/03/membongkar-uud-negara-khilafah-hizbut-tahrir-indonesia-hti-bagian/> (July 26, 2018).

¹²Guntur Romli, "Membongkar UUD Negara Khilafah Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), in <http://www.gunromli.com/2018/03/membongkar-uud-negara-khilafah-hizbut-tahrir-indonesia-hti-bagian/> (July 20, 2018). See also Ardi Yansyah, "Inilah Kenapa Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) wajib dilarang di Indonesia!" in <https://seword.com/politik/inilah-kenapa-hizbut-tahrir-indonesia-hti-wajib-di-larang-di-indonesia>.

¹³ See <https://kumparan.com/@kumparannews/deretan-upaya-kudeta-oleh-hizbut-tahrir> (July 26, 2018).

¹⁴ See "Deretan Upaya Kudeta oleh Hizbut Tahrir" in <https://kumparan.com/@kumparannews/deretan-upaya-kudeta-oleh-hizbut-tahrir> (July 26, 2018). See also <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2017/07/19/10180761/hti-resmi-dibubarkan-pemerintah> (July 26, 2018).

Kartosowirjo perceived the Indonesian government's failure to maintain its sovereignty. He found that because of that agreement, West Java became an area that was vacuum of power. Thus in 1949, together with his followers, he proclaimed the *Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia* (DI/TII) or the Islamic Army of Indonesia in West Java.¹⁵ During the 1950s, this movement spread to Central Java through Amir Fatah (it remained stagnant due to lack of significant support); Aceh with its central figure Tengku Daud Beureuh; South Kalimantan, led by Ibnu Hadjar; and South Sulawesi under the command of Kahar Muzakkar.¹⁶

All movements of the DI/TII were halted through military operations. The West Java wing of the DI/TII ceased as of June of 1962 and Kartosowirjo was arrested. This was followed by Aceh in December 1962 where the movement ended peacefully. One year later, in 1963, Ibnu Hajar's troops were defeated. In February of 1965, Kahar Muzakar died in an armed ambush. However the insurgence of the South Sulawesi DI/TII was totally eradicated in July of 1965.¹⁷ Records of the Indonesian Anti-Terrorist Agency show that some small groups remain to carry on the DI/TII movement, but they are more of an underground organization. According to Ricklefs, in around 1974, Sungkar and Ba'asyir were introduced to a secret group that was the remains of the *Darul Islam* movement. Our fight is in accordance with their principles, said Ba'asyir.¹⁸ In the midst of this conspiracy, the *Jamaah Islamiyah* emerged as a clandestine terrorist organization.¹⁹

Subsequently, according to Ricklefs, in 1985, Sungkar and Ba'asyir fled to Malaysia through Medan.²⁰ They remained hidden in Malaysia until the downfall of Soeharto's regime in 1998.²¹ When they were in Malaysia, Sungkar and Ba'asyir sent several of DI/TII cadres to Afghanistan. Initially, it was in support of the jihad of the Muslims there, but further progressed as a military training for the cadres. It was since then that the JI and Al-Qaeda network became closely linked.

According to Sidney Jones in some cases, intolerants (radical ones) can transform into terrorists. A number of intolerant groups in Cirebon became suicide bombers, as in the case of the incident in the *Al-Dzikra* mosque. In fact, these two groups were headed by committee members of the Indonesian Ulemas Council and one university lecturer.²² Naipospos and a team from the Setara Institute also noted the same thing regarding the transformation of radical groups into terrorist groups. This is due to the fact that terrorist movements, to borrow the term used by Gerlach, has become a SPIN organization, meaning it is *segmented* (scattered), *polycentric* (having many leaders), and is an integrated

¹⁵ Jurnal POLITEIA, Vol.6. No.1, January 2014.

¹⁶ <https://kumparan.com/guntur-romli/bom-surabaya-dan-empat-generasi-teroris-di-indonesia> (July 17, 2018).

¹⁷ <http://www.donisetawan.com/penumpasan-ditii/> (July 17, 2018).

¹⁸ See Ricklefs. 2013. *Mengislamkan Jawa; Sejarah Islamisasi di Jawa dan Penentangannya dari 1930 sampai Sekarang*. Jakarta: Serambi. p. 312.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p.313

²⁰ For further information, see <http://fikrimahmud.tripod.com/artikel/id17.html>.

²¹ For the back ground, see Quinton Tembly. 2010. *Imagining an Islamic state in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jamaah Islamiyah*. Indonesia, No. 89, April, 2010.

²² Sidney Jones. 2015. *Sisi Gelap Demokrasi: Kekerasan Masyarakat Madani di Indonesia*. Jakarta: PUSAD Paramadina. pp. 4-5.

network. In such organizations, what frequently happens is an overlapping between organizations. One person can be a member of different organizations within one period of time²³

Fathali Moghaddam gives this illustration: A terrorist can go through **five internal psychological phases**. First of all, an individual seeks a solution for what he feels is unfair treatment. At the second level, this individual builds up his physical condition to divert the solution to his problem by way of an attack. The individual who actively seeks opportunities to launch his attacks then levels up to the next phase, which takes the form of attacking those he thinks are his enemies. The third phase is where this individual asserts his identity by adopting the moral values of his group. The most crucial phase is when he moves from the third level to the fourth where after a person joins a terrorist organization, with little or no possibility of leaving alive, this person, at the fifth phase, becomes prepared and motivated psychologically to carry out acts of terror.²⁴

The illustration given by Moghaddam explains the condition of Sungkar and Ba'asyir very well.²⁵ The first stage was when they fled to Malaysia because they felt they were being treated unfairly in Indonesia. The second phase was when they sent a number of JI cadres to Afghanistan to prepare themselves physically (military training). When they felt they were ready, they then launched their attacks on those they considered their enemies and so on and so forth.

When we trace back incidents of terror that have taken place from time to time in Indonesia (since the return of Sungkar dan Ba'asyir), especially after the WTC tragedy, we can see that there has been a shift of targets. According to Sholahudin,²⁶ prior to 2010, terrorist groups in Indonesia always targeted Western symbols or *far enemies*. After that, they changed their target from *far enemy* to *near enemy*. Their main target was the government, particularly the police and the army based on an anti-*thagut* motive.²⁷ If they had permanent targets from year to year, it was the churches.²⁸

The death of Osama bin Laden in 2011 was a blow to Al-Qaeda. In the meantime, Ayman Al-Zahwari who replaced him was considered a failure in regard to leading Al-Qaeda. As a consequence, the terrorist network in Indonesia had to cease operations because funding from that source stopped. In the process, followers of Osama split into different groups. Abu Bakar Al-Baghdhadi took advantage of this chaos in the Middle East, especially in Syria and Iraq who were invaded by the US, and declared the establishment of ISIS. ISIS then became a source of reference for terrorist groups in

²³ Ismail Hasani dan Bonar Tigor Naipospos (Ed). 2005. *Dari Radikalisme Menuju Terorisme*. Jakarta: Pustaka Masyarakat Setara. p. 13.

²⁴ Fathali Moghaddam, in Ismail Hasani dan Bonar Tigor Naipospos (Ed). 2005. *Dari Radikalisme Menuju Terorisme*. Jakarta: Pustaka Masyarakat Setara. pp. 13-14.

²⁵ JI established in 1993 as an integral part of Al-Qaeda. Since September, 2008, JI transformed into Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT).

²⁶ <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2016/08/22/14591791/teroris.di.indonesia.dulu.dan.sekarang> (July 16, 2018).

²⁷ It began on April 15, 2011, when a bomb exploded at the Cirebon Resort Police Mosque during Friday Prayers. Terror with the Police as the main target has continued to this day.

²⁸ The latest is the bombing of three churches in Surabaya on May, 13-14, 2018.

Indonesia through the alumni network from the Middle East. The entry point was JAT, which in turn produced new cells such as the *Jamaah Ansharu Daulah* (JAD) led by Aman Abdurrahman,²⁹ the *Jamaah Ansharu Syariah* (JAS) led by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, the *Khatibatul Iman* led by Abu Husna alias Abdur Rohim, the *Khatibah Nusantara* led by BahrumSyah,³⁰ who had a close relationship with Bahrunnaim, the *Mujahidin Indonesia Timur* (MIT) led by Santoso in Poso, Central Sulawesi. Santoso was an ISIS supporter and received aid to establish a caliphate in South East Asia. Specifically in the case of JAD and JAT, both are linked to the *Jamaah Anshoru Khilafah Daulah Nusantara* formed in 2015. All those organizations had the same vision as the DI.³¹

Since the establishment of ISIS, there has been major transformations in terms of the strategy and actors of terror. Among others, ISIS used the Internet to spread their propaganda and terror. These efforts were not without success. This is proven by a confirmation from the BNPT in March 2015, that 541 Indonesian citizens joined ISIS. This shows an extraordinary increase in the number of ISIS followers from 56 persons in August 2014. However, with the weakening of ISIS following the destruction of Mosul and Raqqa, an ISIS terrorist network, including in Indonesia, they appear to have changed their strategy through the media and lone wolves.³² Terrorists are no longer dominated by men and adults, but women and even children became actors of terror, whether those who went directly to Syria as well as those who stayed in the country.³³

II. a. Women's Involvement with Radical Islamic Groups in Indonesia

In many discussions on terrorism is currently focused on issues concerning law enforcement efforts, cooperation between defense institutions, analysis of legal policies, and definitions of terrorism. Women (especially wives) are excluded from the process of dialogue and response to terrorism. Apparently the most recent trend in terrorism is to turn women into perpetrators. If terrorist acts in the past had a masculine face and used a patriarchic approach, recent trends of terror use women (wives) as executors using a feminine approach. The main motivation for women involved with this radical Islamic groups is theological. Initially, they were exposed to a radical understanding of Islam, such as the obligation to kill all *kaffirs* (non-Muslims). They firmly believe the obligation to establish an Islamic state through *jihād*. Women must join in the *jihād* movement in defense of an oppressed Islam. Mostly of them are recruited through marriage with their own husband carrying out a systematic effort to instill a radical Islamic ideology through

²⁹Aman Abdurrahman is an ex-convict for terrorist acts in Aceh in 2010, before that (2004) he was imprisoned for a bombing incident in Cimanggis. Aman is the head of the *Khatib Masyarik* group, a splinter group of the *Khatib Nusantara* led by BahrumSyah. Aman monopolized travel to Syria and forbade people from outside his group to move to Syria. In fact, before leaving for Syria they had to be trained by Aman's group. See Centre For Terrorism and Social Conflict Studies. *Ancaman ISIS di Indonesia*. Unpublished, p. 7-8.

³⁰<http://www.tribunnews.com/internasional/2016/01/21/profil-tiga-wni-yang-jadi-pimpinan-teroris-isis-di-suriyah?page=all> (July 16, 2018).

³¹<https://www.cnnindonesia.com/internasional/20170711112546-121-227012/kehancuran-isis-bisa-jadi-bencana-bagi-indonesia> (July 17, 2018).

³²Working Paper Pusat Kajian Keamanan Nasional, Universitas Bhayangkara Jakarta. 2018. *Terorisme Global; Peta Terorisme dan Strategi Counter-Terrorism*. p. 16.

³³<http://www.tribunnews.com/nasional/2018/05/16/dita-pelaku-bom-di-gereja-surabaya-pernah-kuliah-di-unair-tetapi-di-do?page=all> (July 16, 2018).

“brain-washing”. This means that they are purposely wedded to then instill radical ideas in their minds. Quite a number of them get married in jail. Others are wedded after they have received radical indoctrination. This phenomena indicates that there is a strong indoctrination from the husband about the teachings of extremism and that the wife experiences a struggle to internalize the teaching. It is also very interesting to note that there are findings that show wives also negotiate with their husbands in carrying out the teachings of extremism. This can be taken to mean that the wife's figure experiences the process of constructivism and relational autonomy in the struggle process and its negotiations so far. In addition, the wife can also be seen as an agent to strengthen the spirit of nationality through the values of tolerance.

History shows that women have been involved in wars or other acts with elements of violence, fighting side by side with their male counterparts. Some of them even led violent acts, such as Joan of Arc (France), Golda Meier (Israel), or Cut Nyak Dhien (Indonesia). This is in contradiction to the strong perception that “women by nature tend to prefer peace, being moderate, willing to compromise, and taking a tolerant stance, or the strong conviction of those in various parts of the world that women should be prevented from involvement in any form of violence, including sending them to war. The facts show that those perceptions and general views are more a myth than a reality.

In the past few years, the reality shows that women’s involvement in terrorist acts continue to escalate.³⁴In countries such as Germany, Ireland and Italy in Europe, in Peru in Latin America, also in Gaza and the West Bank in Occupied Zones in Israel, Palestine up to Russia, Chechnya, Sri Lanka and India, Turkey and other regions, including the latest developments taking place in Iraq and Jordan, terrorist groups are relying more and more on women to carry out their acts. These women play a variety of roles as informants, spies, recruiters, acting as human shields, or just becoming objects to satisfy the sexual needs of male terrorists, which is something that cannot be neglected.

In the past two decades, making the most of technology for the achievement of terrorist causes, women have participated in managing terrorist organization publications or websites on the Internet. Women’s role in terrorist suicide acts, turning their bodies into lethal weapons, has intensified.³⁵

According to Bahrin Naim, leader of ISIS from Indonesia, the need to recruit women in acts of terror is because less and less men are willing to become terrorists. He further said: “If in Syria, women are not obligated to carry out *amaliyah* acts, in Indonesia women are allowed to do so because men are more cowardly.” This can be seen in a telegram conversation on June of 2016, Another factor is that women are considered more easily influenced, especially those who have problematic marriages.³⁶

Women are also deemed very loyal to religious teachings and ideology, and thus more militant when carrying out assignments. This is especially true for women who have

³⁴ Knop, Katharina von. 2007. *The Female Jihad: Al-Qaida's Women. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, pp. 397-414. See also Mulia, Musdah. 2018. *Perempuan dalam Gerakan Terorisme di Indonesia*. Akademi Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, (https://www.aipi.or.id/admin/assets/pdf/pdf_file/14052018_Perempuan_Dalam_Gerakan_Terrorisme_di_Indonesia_MusdahMulia.pdf)

³⁵ Alvanou, Maria. 2007. *Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers: The Interplaying Effects of Islam, Nationalism and Honor Culture*. Working Papers Series No.3. Tel Aviv, Israel: Strategic Research and Policy Center, National Defense College, IDF.

³⁶ <https://www.tempo.co/read/fokus/2016/12/15/3402/pola-rekrutmen-teroris-jadikan-perempuan-sebagai-pengantin#W2jOXFtUBprbOfxe> (July 16,2018)

had traumatic experiences, been a victim of domestic violence or are facing problems within their families, or divorce. When brainwashed with radical concepts, women can carry out their mission with a vengeance, becoming even more militant than men.

A number of reasons have emerged as to women's involvement in violence. **Firstly**, compared to men, they usually have more freedom of movement and are not too prone to suspicion by security personnel, and this adds to their value of involvement compared to their male counterpart. This added value has increased mostly because suspicion of possible suicide acts have recently increased as well.³⁷ **Secondly**, women's involvement as suicide bombers has its own attraction for the media, mostly because we are now a digital era, news of such happenings can be shared not only quickly but also in a more powerful manner. This is due to the dramatic effects of actions using women as a weapon, which in turn will strengthen and empathize the struggle of terrorism they are representing and increases sympathy for their cause.³⁸ **Thirdly**, these women's involvement in suicide attacks may encourage men to engage in the same activities. If women can do it, then men should be able to do so as well, although this amplifies the prevailing stereo-typing. And **fourthly**, involvement of women can also be considered as an indicator of women's increasing equality with men in society, regardless of whether those women are aware what bases their actions, because there is a lot of speculation that these woman (some of whom are still children) have been manipulated by their leaders who are mostly men.³⁹ In Indonesia, in 2015 and 2016, there have been more than 250 deportees among which half of them are women and children (they usually travel as families). Between January to March of 2017, the number of deportees has reached more than 140 persons, and 79% out of those people are women and children. They are held in centers provided by the Ministry of Social Affairs for interrogation.

Women's status as wives

Other studies state that even global terrorist groups are benefitting from involvement of women in their organization, not only as recruiters but also as free propaganda cells.⁴⁰ In Indonesia, data from the Directorate General of Correctional Facilities states that up until October 2016, the number of terrorist convicts are 223 persons. Since the enactment of Law No. 15 of 2003 on Terrorism, already 9 women have been declared as being involved in and having a role as terrorist crimes. They are the wives of terrorists. Meanwhile, the Directorate of Deradicalization of the National Agency for Combating Terrorism (BNPT) states that 51 women who are wives of terrorists have been put into a deradicalization program.

Cases of women's roles as wives or prospective wives in the terrorist movement in Indonesia first emerged in the case of Dian Yulia Novi. Dian admitted that she underwent an indoctrination process called the *jihad qital* through the Internet by her own husband, Nur Solihin.⁴¹ Nur Solihin himself is a follower of Bahrudin Naim.⁴² This case drew public

³⁷ Bloom, Mia. 2005. *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror*. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 1-21.

³⁸ Nacos. Brigitte L. 2005. *Portrayal of Female Terrorists in the Media: Similar Framing Patterns in the News Coverage of Women in Politics and in Terrorism*. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. pp. 435-451.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Bhakti, M.A. 2016. *Perempuan dan Terorisme*. Jakarta: Pusat Kajian Radikalisme dan Deradikalisasi February, 2016, in

<http://www.radicalismstudies.org/home/2015-04-19-13-02-08/special-reports-and-analysis/270-perempuan-dan-terorisme.html>.

⁴¹ Siroj, S.A. 2017. *Perempuan dan Terorisme*. in Kompas.com: <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2017/01/06/12565011/perempuan.dan.terorisme>

attention because it was the first case where a wife in Indonesia is recruited as a suicide bomber, through means of marriage. Another case which was carried out by Santoso where the three wives of the leader of the group who were taken along and joined in the fight in the forest. Not only that, the facts that eventually emerged is that because of the sexual needs of the leaders of this group, namely Santoso, Ali Kalora and Basri, their wives were ordered to join in the fight. This was revealed when security forces found birth control pills at the time they raided the terrorists' hide out.⁴³

Prior to the involvement of terrorists' wives becoming known to the public, the Centre for Radicalism and Deradicalization Studies (PAKAR), recounted that 9 wives were involved in terrorist crimes up to 2015 based in a study that was released in early 2016.⁴⁴ Six among those women ended up being tried in criminal court while the others were released because there was no proof of their involvement. Those nine women are wives of terrorists, and they were victims of terrorist activities carried out by their husbands and the terrorist movement that aspired for the establishment of an Islamic state.

The study by PAKAR illustrated how wives were taken advantage of by their husbands, by providing help or caring for the needs of their husbands and the group. Not only that, the majority of those women weren't aware that what they did on the orders of their husbands was part of helping terrorist groups, and they were not even aware that their husbands were affiliated with a terrorist group. This study also explains that the wives of those terrorists were being victimized during in life since the time they were arrested till the time they were released from prison, causing them to be alienated from their families, isolated, vulnerable and economically incapacitated because they could not provide for their families due to isolation and because they bore the status of ex-convicts and even "widows of terrorist". Support and protection from the State for the wives of terrorists seem to be rather half-hearted.

On September 22, 2016, Indonesian security personnel at the Soekarna-Hatta Airport succeeded in preventing the departure of 7 Indonesian citizens who were going to fly to Syria to join ISIS, one among them was a woman strongly suspected as the funder for the project. The interest and appeal for women to join terrorist movement triggered an important question. What made it so appealing for women that they were willing to risk their lives? There are at least four triggering factors for this attraction.⁴⁵

First, religious factors. Elizabeth Pooley found many Muslims in England were drawn to join ISIS because they were convinced that Islam was under attack; a strong desire to establish a new society, free from *thagut* (*enemies of Allah*); religious obligation that women should defend Islam and the chance to become part of and finding a meaningful life goal in a "caliphate sisterhood".⁴⁶ **Second**, an ideological factor.⁴⁷ These

⁴² Jordan, R. 2016. *Ini Wajah 2 Terduga Teroris yang Antar Bom ke Calon 'Pengantin' Dian*. detik.com: <http://news.detik.com/berita/d-3369122/ini-wajah-2-terduga-teroris-yang-antar-bom-ke-calon-pengantin-dian>

⁴³ Dariyanto, E. 2016. *Santoso Pernah Perintahkan Pengikutnya Cari Pil KB dan Pembalut Wanita*. detik.com: <http://news.detik.com/berita/3179840/santoso-pernah-perintahkan-pengikutnya-cari-pil-kb-dan-pembalut-wanita>

⁴⁴ Bhakti, M.A. 2016. *Perempuan dan Terorisme*. See also <http://www.radicalismstudies.org/home/2015-04-19-13-02-08/special-reports-and-analysis/270-perempuan-dan-terorisme.html>

⁴⁵ Debbie Affianty, *Perempuan dalam Kelompok Jihadis dan Terorisme*, pp. 346-348.

⁴⁶ For further information, see Elizabeth Poole. 2002. *Reporting Islam: Media Representations of British Muslims*, New York: I.B.Tauris Publisher.

⁴⁷ See *Jihad Jane' Colleen La Rose gets 10 years in prison* in <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-25630399>. See also, *Jihad Jane Colleen LaRose Became a Terrorist for Love* in <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/jihad-jane-colleen-larose-became-terrorist-love-n284636>.

women are attracted to the ideology of terrorism, one that is militant and strongly resonates a fight to uphold justice. **Third**, a political factor. Poverty, social inequality, violation of Human Rights, and discrimination are the narratives developed in a terrorist movement and for women, these are the factors that trigger a sense of anguish that consequently sets off potential political violence against the State. Extreme radical methods narrated by terrorist group have persuaded many women to join in the fight against an oppressive government. In Indonesia's context, a political defeat for hard-line religious groups has prompted an escalation of terrorist movement carried out by groups who feel marginalized. They use media framing to give the impression that the State is negligent towards those who belong to the majority group in this country. That is why the target of terrorist acts is State symbols and institutions. **Fourth**, a personal factor. Based on the case of Shannon Conley, Anne Speckhard in her book *Bride of ISIS*,⁴⁸ says that ISIS motivates young Western women through the internet and persuades them to leave their countries and become the wives of jihadists or become domestic terrorists in their home country.

Women become the target of religious fundamentalist groups because they still have religious legitimacy to do so. Religious legitimacy is even supported by values that are basically patriarchic in nature. It is not surprising that when a country or society experiences fundamentalism, domestication and the likes, women usually become the first political agenda. Why is that? The reason is because the socio-political cost of women's domestication is very low and easy in the sense that within a patriarchic society, domestication of women will be not face significant socio-political resistance.

Fundamentalist views are very derogatory to a woman's life. This is because those views generally reject the concept of gender equality and equity, birth control and all the elements thereof, such as the use of contraception. They also reject sex education and reproductive health so that women have no understanding of their sexual and reproductive rights. They reject HIV/AIDS patients and People Living with HIV/AIDS, considering them cursed; they reject LGBT groups, protection for rape victims; they reject protection for commercial sex workers, and no less dangerous is that they encourage child marriage and polygamy.

Muslims who preserve fundamentalism have a manipulative tendency and use Islamic teachings to legitimize patriarchic power and isolate women from the public sphere. General observation of women's civil and political rights under Islamic regimes in the world, clearly shows that fundamentalists constrain women in regard to their civil and political rights. Iran's Islamic Constitution of 1979, following the victory of the revolution, for example, although not explicitly emphasizing women's subordination as second-class citizens, has actually restricted the civil and political rights of women in the public sphere.¹⁷

Under the excuse of purifying religion and returning to the Al-Qur'an dan Hadith texts, Islamic fundamentalism underlines the difference between the rights of men and women. In their view, God has purposely made the two human beings different and that difference is not a discrimination but it is for the happiness of mankind. The conclusion is that fundamentalism persuades us to return to religion. However, in the context of women, what they claim to be purification of religion is actually domestication of women. In short,

⁴⁸ Anne Speckhard. 2015. *Bride of ISIS: One Young Woman's Path into Homegrown Terrorism*, New York: Advances Press.

¹⁷ Ann Elizabeth Mayer. 1991. *Islam and Human Rights: Tradition and Politics*. Washington: West View Press. pp. 130-131.

fundamentalism promotes politics that is anti-democracy, anti feminism, anti-pluralism, and anti-humanism.

Women's role in terrorism movement

There are three roles women play in terrorist actions,⁴⁹ and they are: **First**, as followers and loyal companions. Mostly these women are still at the stage of domestication of women. This means that they are not the principal actors but only function as wives, loyal followers and mothers of prospective terrorists. **Second**, as propaganda experts and recruiting agent. Some women involved in terrorist movements such as ISIS are not allowed to go into battle, but their role, especially on social media, is as propaganda experts, religious lecturers, and recruiters for ISIS using a recruitment approach that relies on friendship and relationship.⁵⁰ There are at least two roles of social media. *First*, as a forum for women to learn more about terrorism, the ideology behind terrorism, and they are inter-connected through fellow supporters or recruiters. These women are able to recruit potential followers, spread propaganda, or mobilize supporters. *Second*, social media reveals various activities of women involved in terrorist networks and this information is appealing to many people.

Third, as *fighters/bombers*. Terrorist groups often use women, especially fair-skinned ones as suicide bombers. This is because Westerns tend to stereo-type suicide bombers as coming from Muslim countries. In Indonesia, the first women to be convicted as a suicide bomber was Dian Yulia Novi. She was planning to blow herself up at the State Place on Sunday, December 11, 2016.⁵¹ She admitted to having undergone an indoctrination process called *jihad qital* through the Internet by a terrorist propaganda cell and her prospective husband at the time, Nur Solihin.⁵² Nur Solihin is a member of the network of Bahrin Naim.⁵³ This case drew public attention because it was the first time a wife in Indonesia was recruited as a suicide bomber and the recruitment was achieved through marriage.

II. b. The Trend of Terrorist Families

The latest trend in terrorist acts in Indonesia is to exploit family relations. The bombings in three churches in Surabaya, on Sunday, May 13, 2018, were executed by one family. They consisted of six persons: the father, the mother, two sons (18 and 16 year respectively), and two daughters (12 and 9 years old). A similar incident took place in Surabaya on Monday, May 14, 2018, where a whole family was involved in a suicide

⁴⁹ Debbie Affianty. 2017. *Perempuan dalam Kelompok Jihadis dan Terorisme*, in Muhammad Abdullah Darraz (Ed), *Reformulasi Ajaran Islam: Jihad, Khilafah, dan Terorisme*, Jakarta: Mizan Pustaka. pp 341-342.

⁵⁰ Laura Huey and Eric Witner. 2016. *Exploring a New Role for Women in Terrorism* in *Journal of Terrorism Research*, Vol. 7, Issue 1 - January 2016. See also https://www.researchgate.net/publication/293191152_IS_Fangirl_Exploring_a_New_Role_for_Women_in_Terrorism.

⁵¹ <https://www.viva.co.id/berita/nasional/951622-dian-yulia-wanita-indonesia-pertama-divonis-kasus-teroris>.

⁵² Siroj, S.A. 2017. *Perempuan dan Terorisme*. Kompas.com:

<http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2017/01/06/12565011/perempuan.dan.terorisme>

⁵³ Jordan, R. 2016. *Ini Wajah 2 Terduga Teroris yang Antar Bom ke Calon 'Pengantin' Dian*. detik.com: <http://news.detik.com/berita/d-3369122/ini-wajah-2-terduga-teroris-yang-antar-bom-ke-calon-pengantin-dian>

bombing.⁵⁴ In the past, radicalization needed a long and lengthy process. Apparently, recruiting families seem to be a short cut for a radicalization process.⁵⁵

In the history of terrorist movements, the “terrorist family” phenomenon is not something new. A research by Della Porta conducted in 1995 on the Red Brigade (RB) for example shows that as many as 298 out of 1.214 RB members were blood relatives or members of the same family, namely the parents, husband, wife, children, or other relatives. A research by the UN Commission on the WTC incident also confirmed the “terrorist family” phenomenon. Six out of the 19 hijackers in that incident were related. The 2012 Boston bombers were the Tsarnaev brothers. the Charlie Hebdo incident in France was perpetrated by the Kouachi brothers, and in the Paris attack, it was the Abdessalam brothers who were the actors. In Indonesia, three of the 2002 Bali bombers were brothers, namely Ali Ghufron, Amrozi, and Ali Imron.

How is this “terrorist family” network formed? Initially, in order to establish a network, recruitment through family relations and marriage was considered the easiest method. In simple words, terrorist group members would first try to influence their family members to join their movement. They would also try to marry their relatives or daughters to other members of the terrorist group. Examples of this are when Abdullah Azzam married his daughter to his follower, Abdullah Anas from Algeria, when Abu Muzab al-Zarqawi married a sister of his close friend, Khaled al-Aruri, when Osama bin Laden was married to Amal al-Sada, the daughter of a Yamanese tribal chief to make recruitment of new Al-Qaida members in that country much easier. In Indonesia, Ali Ghufron married Paridah Abas, the sister of Nasir Abas, a fellow alumni from Afghanistan. Baharuddin Latif, too, married his daughter Arina Rahma to Noordin M. Top and so on.

Family relation and marriage are the most effective method in forming “terrorist families” because there is a psychological influence that binds one to the other and ensure mutual support. Through this method, not only do they become members of the same terrorist group, but also members of the same family. (a family bond). Mutual support has an affective and cognitive connotation. Affective because they have a close relationship (intimate) as a family. Cognitive is in the sense that that closeness can be used as an instrument of peer-pressure, guaranteeing loyalty of the members thus forming a very strong solidarity network. Also, due to tighter surveillance by security forces, terrorists are starting to use other recruitment methods within a closed group that does not easily give rise to suspicion, such as in family groups. Since there are binding elements within a family, such as love, trust and life-long commitment, it is easier for terrorists to recruit followers.

In terms of recruitment, involving and employing relatives, especially through marriage is much more effective because building trust is easier with family members than with acquaintances. Especially when surveillance by security forces is very tight, terrorists’ movements are constrained. So terrorists must take extra care when recruiting members. The least risky option is to capitalize on family relation or marriage. The implication of this

⁵⁴<https://sains.kompas.com/read/2018/05/17/120500223/teror-bom-oleh-keluarga-kenapa-anak-anak-dilibatkan>.

⁵⁵ Mohammad M. Hafez. 2016. *The Ties that Bind: How Terrorists Exploit Family Bonds*, California, Naval: Postgraduate School Monterey.

option is that people with no record of terrorism can suddenly become terrorists because they were recruited by a relative or married to a member of a terrorist family. Dzakar Tsarnaev, the Boston bomber was only a spontaneous terrorist simply because he was asked by his brother, Tamerlan Tzarnaev.

In Indonesia's context, Ali Imron could also be considered a spontaneous terrorist because he was induced by his brother, Ali Ghufron. This recruitment process is usually called a bloc recruitment, where recruiting a previously formed group is much easier because of social pressure, a fear of being left behind, and a desire to maintain relationships. Not only that, bloc recruitment can also minimize resistance and treachery. The closeness of a family bond and marriage is a more effective method used by terrorists to establish a network because there is psychological binding pressure that binds and mutual support. This close family bond also prevents differing view points between one another, thus strengthening even more the bond that has been established. When one becomes family, it becomes much easier to build trust rather than with other people. Also, the fact that terrorists are under close surveillance of security forces and that their movements are restricted makes it very imperative for caution when adding members.

The most appalling part of this terrorist family trend is the involve of children as terrorists. The mastermind behind the Paris bombing, Abdel Abaoud, for example, took along his brother, Younes Abaaoud, who was only 12 years old, to Syria to join ISIS. He also recruited his female cousin, Hasna, who was 14 years old, to guard his apartment in Saint Denis Paris, who later died in a subsequent police ambush. During 2013-2016, a large number of extremists from all over the world (including from Indonesia) left for Iraq and Syria to join ISIS, and they took their families along with them, including children and teenagers. These children and teenagers can certainly be considered as spontaneous extremists because of pressure from their parents. Although they were involved in the context of terrorists as a group, they are frequently considered part of a "terrorist family"

The same thing happened with the bombers of three churches in Surabaya. Dita and his wife, Puji, went to Syria to join ISIS, taking along their four children. While in Syria, the children underwent a radicalization process (at a different level than the adults of course). That is why, when they returned to Indonesia, Dita could easily involve and exploit his wife and four children in the terrorist act they carried out.

It can be concluded that the terrorist family trend emerged because characteristically, terrorist groups need a high level of trust and solidarity. Therefore family bond and marriage are very important in their actions. Another factor is minimizing the potential for recruiting the wrong persons, meaning those who are less reliable and loyal which can pose a danger in terms of secrecy, and to the unity and existence of the terrorist group itself.

So how do we prevent and mitigate this "terrorist family" phenomenon? In today's digital 4.0 era, many lone fighters have emerged, meaning terrorists who are not an integral part of mainstream terrorist organizations. Due to tighter surveillance by security forces, the prospect of more lone fighters emerging as families is getting larger. To overcome this, prevention and deradicalization efforts must be viewed as a 'family' package and even as

an ‘extended family’ package approach. When a father becomes a suspected terrorist, the target of mitigation should also include his wife and children and maybe his relatives suspected as having been exposed to radical and extremist ideologies. The contrary is also true, meaning that when an offspring child has been arrested for terrorist acts, the family should also be investigated, in this case the siblings, parents or other relatives, particularly those with the most potential to be asked to join a ‘terrorist family’. In other words, mitigation of terrorists should focus not only on holistic methods, but also on humanitarian values in accordance with Human Rights principles.

III. National Policy

The government must have the ability to prevent strengthening of radical groups, and this can be achieved through three ways. *First*, the government should open a channel of democratic political participation for Islamic groups. *Second*, the government must carry out a systemic anti-violence strategy on radical Islamic groups that are prone to acts of violence and terrorism. *Third*, the government must implement an ‘effective State’ that guarantees safety and legal certainty on the one side, and education as well as social services on the other, to the majority of the population,

In order to counter radicalism and terrorism, the government has issued Government Regulation In Lieu of a Law (Perppu) No 2 of 2002 on Eradication of Terrorism. This is followed by Government Regulation In Lieu of a Law (Perppu) No. 2 of 2002 on utilization of Perppu No. 1 to conduct investigations on the Bali Bomb case. In addition, the government also declared the *Jamaah Islamiah* as the organization responsible for the Bali Bom terror. In further developments, Perppu No. 1 of 2002 was then enacted in Law No. 15 of 2003 on Eradication of Terrorist Crimes, and Perppu No. 2 of 2002 was enacted in Law No. 16 of 2003.⁵⁶ Aside from enacting laws, the government has also formed the *Densus 88* (Special Detachment) in 2002. In addition to establishing a unit assigned with the duty to deal with terrorists, the government also formed the National Counter Terrorisms Agency (BNPT) in 2010 with its main duty and function to counter terrorism.⁵⁷

In other words, the Indonesian government chooses to eradicate terrorism through a law-enforcement model. This is evident from the government’s enactment and implementation of laws. Almost all the terrorist have been arrested by the *Densus 88* based on prevailing laws. According to Suhadi, head of the BNPT, Law No. 15 of 2003 on Countering Terrorism has become the most complete Law at the present time, because it

⁵⁶However Law No. 16 of 2003 on Implementation of Perrpu No. 2 of 2002 was revoked by the Constitutional Court based on a judicial review requested by Masykur Abdul Kadir, one of the Bali Bomb I actors. The Constitutional Court accepted the judicial review on Law No. 16 of 2003 because the validity of that law was in contradiction with the 1945 State Constitution, particularly article 28 I of 1945 State Constitution that stipulates that the right not to be retroactively prosecuted by a law constitutes a human right that cannot be compromised in any way whatsoever.

<http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/lt5b0531a3c651d/sekelumit-kisah-perjalanan-uu-anti-terorisme> (July 17, 2018).

⁵⁷ For further information, see <https://www.bnpt.go.id/tentang-bnpt>

contains three important aspects in countering terrorism, namely prevention, enforcement and protection for victims as well as compensation,⁵⁸

In addition, the government's measures to prevent terrorism and radicalism include involving the civil society, particularly for advocacy in several regions based on a Human Rights framework.⁵⁹ This framework has in fact been implemented long before the issue of terrorism became rampant. Some of the initiatives include establishment of the Coordinating Forum for the Prevention of Terrorism (FKPTP), as a forum for the prevention of terrorism in 32 provinces involving the regional government, academicians, the police and ulemas. In today's context, the role of local governments become increasingly significant with their involvement in all prevention measures, as the Police and the BNPT are doing.⁶⁰

In face of an increasing trend in women as actors of terrorism and families as terrorists, the BNPT has engaged in a collaboration with a number of Islamic women's organizations, such as the *Fatayat NU*, *Muslimat NU* and the Muhammadiyah women's groups, namely *Aisyiah* dan *Nasyiatul 'Aisyiah* and other women's NGOs. Among the activities carried out are counter radicalism and terrorism through religious education that is moderate and family based. This collaboration is formed to shield families and the public so they are not so easily exposed to religious ideology based on radicalism and terrorism. This is important in view of the increasing trend of targeting women and children as agents of radicalism and terrorism.⁶¹

The prevention of terrorism and radicalism initiative is also done in collaboration with religious figures and organizations In Indramayu, for example, the local government is working with NU to prevent radicalism and thus Indramayu has become a safe and conducive zone. The next region is in the District of Pohuwato, a region considered very vulnerable to entry of terrorism and radicalism ideology. The local government of Pohuwato works together with inter-faith figures in implementing various measures and policies to strengthen and empower communities. This includes efforts to strengthen the economy of the community and implement a dissemination program on the dangers of radicalism. This program also engages a number of relevant agencies, such as the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Police.⁶²

A number of Districts and Municipalities have also succeeded in preventing intolerance, radicalism and violent extremism. Wonosobo, for example, uses a Human Rights framework to overcome issues of disharmony, and at the same time engaging the local community in local governance. Wonosobo has successfully protected all its citizens

⁵⁸ <https://news.okezone.com/read/2018/05/26/340/1903139/kepala-bnpt-undang-undang-terorisme-indonesia-terlengkap-di-dunia> (July 17, 2018).

⁵⁹ Zainal Abidin, dkk. *Peran Kabupaten/Kota dalam Mengatasi Intoleransi, Radikalisme dan Ekstremisme Dengan Kekerasan*. Naskah panduan Human Rights City-INFID. pp. 5-6.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

⁶¹ <https://www.bnpt.go.id/kepala-bnpt-bentengi-perempuan-dari-ancaman-terorisme.html>.

⁶² Zainal Abidin, dkk. *Peran Kabupaten/Kota dalam Mengatasi Intoleransi, radikalisme dan Ekstremisme Dengan Kekerasan*. p. 21. See also <http://www.jabarprov.go.id/index.php/news/22309/2017/04/04/Pemda-dan-NU-Bersinergi-Cegah-Paham> (July 17, 2018).

including the Ahmadiyah minority group. Wonosobo has the highest population of Ahmadiyah devotees, numbering around 6.000. One village in Wonosobo, Buntu Village, has been recognized as a Pluralist Tourist Village in Indonesia because its citizens embraces a tolerant culture and freedom of religion.⁶³ Aside from Wonosobo, the District of Bojonegoro is also considered as an open district. Bojonegoro has been deemed successful in implementing human rights principles.

In addition to the local governments, a number of universities have also declared their institutions as anti radicalism and terrorism.⁶⁴ The leadership of universities, including Islamic Religious Universities has also participated in monitoring their students to prevent them from being lured into radicalism. Amount the measures taken are establishing a close relationship with the students. This closeness will make the students more open, communicative and free to express their opinions. The students need to be given ample opportunity to pursue their highest achievements, and each achievement should be given appreciation by the leadership of the University. In this way, there will be no room for under-achieving activities.

There needs to be clear guidelines and code of ethics to be implemented consistently in all student activities, so that all their activities in and out of the campus are monitored, controlled, credible and accountable. Requirements should be put in place for use of all facilities on campus, including use of the prayer room and mosque, in order to avoid misuse of those facilities. No less important is to evaluate implementation and content of class subjects and religious classes, whether intra-curricular as well as extra-curricular, so as to avoid infiltration of intolerant religious views. Lastly, students must be encouraged to take active part in religious activities that reflect the moderate views (*wasatiyyah*) of Islam.

Those various approaches are known as a conception of Preventing Violent Extremism (PVA) or later also known as Countering Violent Extremism (CVE). In the context of Indonesia, this is a relatively new concept because the approach used so far are security measures with the enactment of the law on Terrorism. Non-security measures are used in a limited way, such as through a deradicalization program, and establishing the BNPT. The most important element of the CVE approach requires sufficient collaboration between all related parties, whether the government at the national as well as the regional level, other State agencies, in international cooperation and with civil society roles. In the framework of this approach, the role of Regional Governments and local civil society organizations becomes very important to ensure implementation of prevention of violent extremism at the local level.

In the past few years, CVE has become an important focus of some CSOs in Indonesia. They also provide assistance for families of terrorists, convicted terrorists, and terrorist family deportees. It is difficult to deny, however, that mitigating the issue of terrorists at a later stage does not have much of an influence in view of the increasing trend

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ See East Java Universities Declaration of Anti Radicalism and Terrorism in <https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/perguruan-tinggi-se-jawa-timur-deklarasi-anti-radikalisme-dan-terorisme/3931135.html> (July 17, 2018).

of intolerance. This intolerance trend has become a fertile field and easy target for terrorists to recruit new members and form new networks.

IV. Analysis and Conclusion

Indonesia is facing a situation of increasing intolerance, radicalism and violent extremism. A number of studies have reiterated that since the reforms era, the main problem that was prevalent before the intensification of terrorism acts, was intolerance.⁶⁵ Sidney Jones in fact concluded that intolerant groups have transformed into terrorists.⁶⁶ The existence of these intolerant organizations has given rise to concern that they will contribute to the emergence of many more terrorist groups. The latest data shows a greater cause for concern for increasing intolerance, even at the High School student level.

A number of regions have shown a worrying trend in intolerance followed by rising political identity.⁶⁷ Young people who are exposed to religious information filled with suspicion and hatred tend to reject or oppose other detested groups having their citizenship rights fulfilled, and justify and support radical actions and movements.⁶⁸ During 2016, the Police have handled 170 terrorism cases, an increase by two folds the number compared to 2015 where there were 82 cases.⁶⁹ This situation is a threat to the people's life, to democracy and protection of human rights.

The fact that intolerance is gaining momentum is proven by results of some studies, like the research by PPIM that reveals 51,1 percent of high school/university students have intolerant views. Those who also stated they would be willing to carry out intolerant acts number 34.1 percent. The students also have a radical side which could be problematic in that the study shows 34,3 percent of the students have radical views and those who are willing to carry out radical acts are 7.0 percent.⁷⁰

⁶⁵According to data from Social Progress Imperative, the intolerance score in Indonesia from 2014 to 2017 continues to increase. In 2014 the intolerance score was 27,9 and in 2017 it was 35,47. This figure was taken from five components namely: tolerance towards immigrants, tolerance towards LGBT people, discrimination and violence against minorities, tolerance in religion, and the community security network. From those five sub-components, the lowest score was for religious tolerance at a score of 2,0. See, "Checking Data; Is It True That Religious Intolerance Increasing?" in <https://tirto.id/benarkah-intoleransi-antar-umat-beragama-meningkat-cEPz> (July 19, 2018). Long before that, violent intolerance was against the Ahmadiyah, Syiah and other groups happened in Indonesia. See further the Human Rights Index released by the Setara Institute since 2011-2016 in this page: <http://setara-institute.org/category/publikasi/indeks-ham/>

⁶⁶Jones Sidney. 2015. *Sisi Gelap Demokrasi: Kekerasan Masyarakat Madani di Indonesia*. Jakarta: PUSAD Paramadina. pp. 4-5. See also Ismail Hasani and Naipospos, Bonar Tigor (Ed). 2005. *Dari Radikalisme Menuju Terorisme*. Jakarta: Pustaka Masyarakat Setara. p. 13.

⁶⁷ Arga Sumantri, *Survey: Intoleransi di Jakarta Mengkhawatirkan*, Metrotvnews, March, 2017 <<http://pilkada.metrotvnews.com/news-pilkada/4bar90Zk-survei-intoleransi-di-jakarta-mengkhawatirkan>>

⁶⁸ Survey Wahid Foundation, 86 Aktivis Rohis Ingin Berjihad', Berita Satu, February, 2017 <<http://www.beritasatu.com/aktualitas/414934-survei-wahid-foundation-86-aktivis-rohis-ingin-berjihad-ke-suriyah.html>>

⁶⁹ Rappler, '<https://www.rappler.com/indonesia/data-dan-fakta/156900-daftar-aksi-rencana-teror-indonesia-2016>

⁷⁰ See the survey by the PPIM Research Center in 2017, *Api Dalam Sekam; Keberagamaan Muslim Gen-Z* (Burning Embers, Diversity of Gen-Z Muslims) p. 8.

In addition, the Alvara Institute also reveals a high level of intolerance among professionals, whether they work for the government, in the private sector or for State-owned Enterprises. As much as 40,5 percent of Civil Servants agree to an Islamic State while the remaining 59.5 percent stated they didn't agree. In regards to employees of private companies, as much as 34,8 percent stated their agreement of an Islamic State and the rest said they did not agree. In State-owned Enterprises, the majority or 83.5 percent said they didn't agree to an Islamic State while the remaining 16,5 percent said they agreed.⁷¹ Other potential for radicalism comes from views on the type of the State. As much as 16 percent of professionals stated that a caliphate state would be the ideal form for Indonesia compared to its current status as a Unitarian State (NKRI). This potential for radicalism is even more reinforced by the agreement for a jihad to establish an Islamic State or caliphate by as many as 19,6 percent.⁷²

Another condition that may raise cause for concern is that terrorists are very actively using internet-based digital media to spread propaganda content in a fast and massive manner. Aside from hate speeches attacking pro-democracy groups, terrorist propaganda also spread hoax content with the aim to generate public sympathy and support. Including to recruit new terrorists. The younger generation has become the target of terrorist propaganda in the digital world. This group are the largest users of the Internet. The Indonesian Association of Internet Service Providers (APJII) has found that 75,5 percent of internet users in 2016 were aged between 10 to 24 years old. This shows that terrorists are targeting the younger generation in a massive way, and based on the survey done by the PPIM on radicalism among young people, this is truly a worrying phenomenon.⁷³

Radicalism is a process initiated from an idea and teaching that begins at the individual level. In this context, early detection by involving women can be very effective. This is based on the fact that women play a vital role in the family, particularly in shaping the character of the children. Women also offer different perspectives when trying to find a solution to problems.⁷⁴ They often employ a more gentle approach compared to men. This is despite a study on gender that says that feminist perspective is aimed more at justification on a patriarchic culture that emphasizes on men's physical strength and their limited capacity in terms of feelings (negative masculinity) as well as a recognition on women's limited physical power and the strength of their feelings (positive femininity).⁷⁵

Women are very effective weapons against terrorism when the strategy used is a community-based one. They need to be empowered as actors to improve security and for early detection through a community-based program relying on them to monitor the media and other campaign facilities. There are at least three things that need to be done in order that women can become agents of peace. *First*, reduce gender inequality and give women a

⁷¹ Alvara Research Center. 2017. *Potensi Radikalisme dikalangan Profesional Indonesia*. p. 37

⁷² Ibid, p. 41 – 43.

⁷³ See PPIM Research Center. 2017. *Api Dalam Sekam; Keberagamaan Muslim Gen-Z*. p. 8

⁷⁴ Lisa R. Wulan. 2010. *Enhancing the Role of Women in Indonesia to Counter Terrorism*, Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, p. 7.

⁷⁵ Paul, Amar. 2011. *Middle East Masculinity Studies: Discourses of "Men in Crisis," Industries of Gender in Revolution*, Journal of Middle East Women's Studies, 7.3. pp. 36-70.

larger role to participate in various social activities. Reducing support for radicalism is the ultimate effort to counter the threat of terrorism and its source, which is extremism ideology. Strengthening messages of non-violence and important measures to the community's strong resilience needs to be ensured. Further implementation should be in the form of policies to promote gender equality and elimination of discrimination which can create a conducive environment to reduce support for extremist ideology.⁷⁶

Second, strengthen multi-sectoral well being to prevent the emergence of radicalism. Well-being within the family is mostly a burden placed on women's shoulders. Involvement of women in these efforts can be applied in the multi-sectors of life such as strengthening the economy, family education, religion, and the law, and community-based information, as well as early detection. This is because the root cause of terrorism is personal alienation and inferiority complex such as poverty, so that developing the economy is a must. There is a positive link in the success of deradicalization through improved economy based on education and gender equality.

Third, turning women into locomotives at the front line in moderate religious education, especially beginning from, but not limited to, the family environment. Morocco can be made as an example on counter-terrorism measures based on education to curb the spread of radicalism. The Moroccan government created a moderate religious group by training and educating women to develop an education model with a more moderate understanding of religion. The women who have been trained are then assigned to work in communities, mosques and religious classes in the City of Rabat and Casablanca.⁷⁷

Another factor to take into consideration is the new terrorism trend that is trans-national, global, and offensive by developing privatization of violence. The target is to build a psychological infrastructure on the public to force them to radically change their behavior. Eradication of trans-national terrorism gives a new dimension of which the process to resolve conflicts become more complex. To overcome the issue of trans-national terrorism, there needs to be a collaboration among several countries. First, decision makers must believe and be able to convince the public that the countering terrorism is not a battle against religion.

The government is very aware of those challenges and is determined to take joint measures to overcome the issue. President Joko Widodo stated that Indonesia is currently facing a challenge in the views and actions that pose a threat to our diversity, including the ideology that is in contradiction to Pancasila.⁷⁸ The Vice-President, Jusuf Kalla, has conveyed the same message. In his opinion, Indonesia is currently experiencing global radicalism symptoms.⁷⁹ The president hopes that all parties actively promote synergy

⁷⁶Rohan Gunaratna and Karunya Jayasena. 2011. *Global Support for al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden: an Increase or Decrease?*, UNISCI Discussion Papers 25, pp. 10-16.

⁷⁷ Wulan, *Enhancing the Role of Women*. p.10.

⁷⁸ BBC Indonesia, *Jokowi: Ada Ideologi Tak Toleran yang Mengancam Indonesia*, BBC Indonesia (June 1, 2017 <<http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-40116505>>

⁷⁹ Teguh Firmansyah, 'Wapres: Indonesia Alami Radikalisme Global', *Republika*, 23 Desember 2016 <<http://www.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/politik/16/12/23/oindqk377-wapres-indonesia-alami-gejala-radikalisme-global>>

between democracy, religion and tolerance, and support stability and peace for the welfare of the people. The president emphasizes the importance of carrying out a ‘collective action’ to counter violent extremism brought about by global injustice of which the impact is terrorism in various parts of the world, aside from Indonesia.⁸⁰

Other countries are facing the same situation as Indonesia. The UN has declared that violent extremism groups have brought about a situation of insecurity and conflict in various parts of the world, thus undermining collective efforts to maintain peace and security, sustainable development, protection of human rights, and promotion of rule of law.⁸¹ Violent extremism poses a threat to the fulfillment of human rights, such as the right to live, the right to freedom, the right to security, freedom of expression, freedom of association and freedom of religion.⁸²

One of the characteristics of today’s terrorism is the intensity of a religious dimension. This brings up two general arguments related to the root causes of the emergence of terrorism. The first argument that seems quite dominant explains that poverty, injustice, and social inequality are fundamental problems that result in a feeling of helplessness and prompt groups who feel marginalized to fight back, and in the process the issue of “religious element” is frequently used as a trigger for rebellion. The second argument, although seemingly less popular, is that misinterpretation of religious teachings is the factor that prompts a small number of groups to carry out acts of terror. Terrorism uses religion as a justification for rebellion and violent acts. This attitude is an impact of globalization, widespread interaction and interdependence. In the same way, the anti-modernity stance of radical groups is believed to have emerged from a cultural condition eroded by globalization, particularly in terms of freedom for women. Another factor is weakening traditional values that is seen as disadvantageous to the interest of established groups.

As a consequence, the Indonesian government must find the root causes of terrorism, including finding a way to manage internal conflicts that have never been resolved and political discontent that has been going on for a long time. Aside from being caused by internal and local factors, this new form of terrorism is also triggered by sentiments of anti-West, anti-modernity and anti-globalist, with the desire to restore a messianic teaching in this modern century.

In my opinion, the government must focus their attention on why so many people are attracted to violent extremism groups. Some studies show, in many countries, radicalism and violent extremism are driven by many factors, among which are: social-economic injustice, so many cases of marginalization and discrimination cases, poor governance which is evident from the quality of public services, a high level of violation of human rights, weak law enforcement, and continuous conflicts that are never resolved.⁹

⁸⁰ Arlina Arshad, Indonesian president Joko Widodo urges 'collective action' to fight violent extremism, *The Strait Times*, November 1, 2016 <<http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/indonesian-president-joko-widodo-urges-collective-action-to-fight-violent-extremism>>. UN General Assembly, *Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism*, December 24, 2015, A/70/67

⁸¹ Ibid

⁸² Ibid

Experience in managing the threat of violent extremism requires a comprehensive strategy that goes beyond the use of military intelligence and law enforcement mechanisms.¹⁰

Prevention of intolerance, radicalism and violent extremism must be done through policies, programs and interventions that are aimed at preventing terrorists from achieving their objectives by using violence as well as to avoid a radicalization process through politics, culture, and religion. Building a contextual and local peace using an open approach is one of the methods applied, aside from legal punishment for actors of hate speech and terrorism. There is also needs to be an ongoing dialogue with all elements of society, whether religious leaders, local leaders, youth groups, women groups, executives as well as legislators, and law enforcers in efforts to resolve conflict and countering activities with intolerant potential. One reasonable and promising strategy is by establishing a society that is inclusive, pluralist and just, and based on full respect of human rights, and ensuring there is ample economic opportunity for all.

In addition to the government, the civil society should also take measures to counter terrorist acts. Among the civil society who are actively voicing their stance are the NU and Muhammadiyah. These two largest Muslim organizations have the opinion that countering terrorism will not have much success if only the terrorists are prosecuted. This is because intolerance and radicalism is still rife in society. There needs to be counter-ideology measures. These two largest Muslim organizations have long offered an understanding of Islam that is serene and peaceful, based on *rahmatan lil alamin*, which is in contrast with the views of jihadists a la Osama and his followers. In addition to those two organizations, a number of civil society organizations also play a role in advocacy, urging the people to adopt an open and tolerant stance.

Finally, we have to admit that during the transition period towards democracy, the stability of our nation has been tested by the numerous conflicts that have emerged. Based on experience of some countries that have gone through a transition period towards democracy after the fall of an authoritarian regime, becoming a democratic nation did not take place automatically. Instead of achieving democratization, what they faced was in fact a new kind of authoratarianism which was no less authorotarian than the previous regime. In fact, even in an established politcial structure, the transition period will give rise to a temporary legimacy crisis. If the transition process is not strengthened by consolidation, it is very possible that the legitimacy crisis will be never-ending. Rampant religion-based violent conflicts that have been going on since post-reforms to now, is a manifestation of past conflicts that have finally found room to flourish. Decision makers must believe and be able to convince the people that the war against terrorism is not a war against religion.

Therefore, the State must focus on implementing a comprehensive counter terrorism strategy and combine it with measures to manage pluralism within a civil democracy framework in a systematic manner as a solution to overcome radicalism and terrorism. Merely relying on ad-hoc responses that just prioritize a security aspect are clearly no longer sufficient. The State must be firm in enforcing the law when radicalism-based violence happens. The Pancasila and the Constitution should be the principal source of reference. The Constitution is the main reference. Law enforcers must dare to take a

neutral and fair stance, although it may be in contradiction to the interest of the majority. Both stances can only be ascertained when the elite authorities and decision makers have a comprehensive understanding of religious teachings, and also have a strong commitment to national values and the local wisdom of Indonesia. The State must also involve the civil society and work hand in hand to counter the threat of intolerance, radicalism and terrorism and the State must always prioritize a human rights framework.

V. Policy Recommendations

1. Reassert the government's dignity (executive, judicative and legislative) by upholding values of Pancasila (the State Ideology), the Constitution, democracy and fulfillment of human rights.
2. Support economic actors, ensure social justice and welfare for all in the hope that those efforts can reduce poverty and prevent increasing social-economic inequality.
3. Strengthen the cooperation network between civil society organizations and the various elements of society through dialogues for nation building, cultural dialogues and inter-faith and religious dialogues.
4. More open discussions and dialogues with radical groups in order to gradually achieve a mutual understanding between diverse population.
5. More civics education programs based on principles of diversity, tolerance and pluralism.
6. Increase number of media that offer news in a peaceful way, are credible, pro women and vulnerable groups, uphold principles of equality, justice and peace.
7. Widespread dissemination on religious interpretation that is humanist, pluralist and compatible with universal values of humanity, and in alignment with the State Ideology and Constitution.
8. Empower the people so that they dare to speak up about injustice, intolerance and discrimination, and encourage them to actively promote a culture of peace.
9. Encourage regional governments to reinforce democracy through concrete policies to minimize discrimination and intolerant practices.

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